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CoNS'l'lTUTIONAL LAw-DuE PRoCEss-RrGHT TO CoUNSEL IN STATE CoURTS
-Petitioner was tried before a jury on a charge of larceny, convicted and
sentenced to a penitentiary term. He did not request counsel, and the court
made no offer to appoint counsel. In the course of the trial, petitioner was prejudiced by his failure to object to certain errors in evidence. In a petition fol!
habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, he alleged denial of a
constitutional right of counsel. On answer, it was averred that in petitioner's
conduct of his own defense he displayed a "familiarity with legal process in the
criminal courts." A transcript of petitioner's long criminal record, including eight
convictions, was attached to the answer. The state supreme court denied the
writ. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. Whereas
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not automatically
require appointment of counsel by state courts in non-capital cases, nevertheless
that constitutional provision does require that the accused be given a fair trial,
which in this instance necessitated an appointment of counsel. Gibbs v. Burke,
337 U.S. 773, 69 S.Ct. 1247 (1949).
In this country it has never been seriously questioned that one has a right
to be represented by counsel in every type of case in every court if he employs
his own counsel. Only when one is unable to do so in a criminal case does the
question of his right to counsel become controversial. It is now well established
that in every criminal proceeding in the federal courts counsel must be afforded
to indigents in the absence of intelligent and competent waiver.1 Prosecutions
in state courts may involve rights to counsel under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and may also involve rights to counsel under state

1 This rule was laid down in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938), as
an interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. The holding is now codified as Rule 44 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. (1946) §687.
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constitutions, statutes and court rules.2 Whether or not a state court is bound by
the Fourteenth Amendment to supply counsel to indigents has been made to
depend in part on the gravity of the offense with which the accused is charged.
In capital cases the determination has been that states must provide indigents
with counsel.3 In non-capital cases, such as the principal case, the court adheres
to the rule of Betts v. Brady.4 There it was held that for non-capital offenses in
state courts the right to counsel under the due process clause exists only if a fair
hearing is not possible otherwise. Outwardly, such a view would appear to be
consistent with the analysis of Justice Cardozo in the Palko case.5 That analysis
denied that the Fourteenth Amendment so incorporated the Bill of Rights as to
make the first eight amendments binding on the states. Justice Cardozo said that
he would select as inviolate against state transgression only those rights which
are the result of "the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at
the base of all our civil and political institutions."6 Cases supplementary to Betts
v. Brady have decided that in serious non-capital cases a fair hearing is not possible without appointment of counsel where the defendant is ignorant, youthful
and inexperienced, where the trial judge is careless or misinformed, where the
matter at issue is of a technical nature, or where the accused has been tricked by
state officials or held incommunicado.7 The principal case is a logical development along these lines. It takes note of the actual prejudice suffered by the
petitioner in the unaided conduct of his defense. However, a minority of the
Court feel that the protection afforded indigent defendants under the rule of
Betts v. Brady is inadequate. Basing their argument in part on the assertion that
the Fourteenth Amendment made the Bill of Rights binding on the states, they
would grant to accused persons in state courts the same right to counsel enjoyed
in federal courts. But a more compelling argument advanced by the minority
justices is that even if the entire Bill of Rights is not applicable to the states, in
accordance with the Palko doctrine, the right to counsel is a "fundamental principle of liberty and justice" and, therefore, satisfies the Palko test for inclusion
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 Clearly, the ordinary layman is no match
2 By 1931 all states had provided for the assignment of counsel to defend indigent
accused persons in capital cases. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Prosecution 30 (1931). "In thirty-five states, there is some clear legal
requirement or an established practice that indigent defendants in serious non-capital as well
as capital criminal cases (e.g., where the crime charged is a felony, a 'penitentiary offense',
an offense punishable by imprisonment for several years) be provided with counsel on request." Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 at 477, note 2, 62 S.Ct. 1252 (1942).
3 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S.
471, 65 S.Ct. 363 (1945); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 68 S.Ct. 763 (1948).
4 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252 (1942).
5 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937).
6 Justice Cardozo quotedHebertv. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 at 316, 47 S.Ct. 103 (1926).
7 Cases collected in 48 Col. L. Rev. 1076 (1948).
s The minority views are presented in Justice Black's dissenting opinions in Betts v.
Brady, supra, note 2, at 474 and in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 at 68, 67 S.Ct. 1672
(1947). See also Justice Douglas' dissent is Bute v. Illinois, supra, note 3, at 677.
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for a prosecutor learned in the law and skilled in trial technique. 9 The trial
judge, because of the psychological pressure of impartiality, cannot take the
place of defense counsel. Neither can the court carry on the pre-trial investigative function of defense counsel. Appellate review of the record cannot sufficiently penetrate the circumstances of the case to determine whether the defense
was adequately presented. Furthermore, Betts v. Brady ignores the basic theory
of the adversary system, which rests on the premise that the best method of
ascertaining truth and insuring justice is to promote a competent presentation
of each side of the case. Under the present rule, an indigent is faced with a
greater probability of conviction by reason of his poverty. From the standpoint
of the due process requirement of a "fair hearing," that fact alone should be
decisive. 10
Charles Myneder

Powell v. Alabama, supra, note 3, at 68.
"It is not to be thought of, in a civilized community, for a moment, that any citizen
put in jeopardy of life or liberty, should be debarred of counsel because he was too poor to
employ such aid. No court could be respected, or respect itself, to sit and hear such a trial."
Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 at 18 (1854).
9
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